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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1950s and 1960s, Congress attempted to battle voter 
discrimination through case-by-case litigation with the help of civil 
rights legislation from 1957, 1960, and 1964.1 For example, “Title I of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 expedited the hearing of voting cases 
before three-judge courts and outlawed some of the tactics used to 
disqualify [black citizens] from voting in federal elections.”2 These 
attempts failed to create long-term change; barring certain types of 
discriminatory voting practices simply led to a modification of 
methods3—Southern voting officials would do everything from ignore 
court orders to freeze voting rolls by closing registration offices.4 To 
combat these invidious tactics and “to banish the blight of racial 
discrimination in voting,”5 Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 
1965.6 
 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Duke University School of Law. 
 1.  South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313 (1966). 
 2.  Id. at 314. The Civil Rights Act of 1957 granted the Attorney General authority to 
seek injunctions against any interference with the right to vote based on race. The Civil Rights 
Act of 1960 allowed the Attorney General to access “local voting records, and authorized courts 
to register voters in areas with systemic discrimination.” Id. 
 3.  H.R. REP. NO. 89-439, at 2441 (1965). See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 314 (noting that 
following the enactment of civil rights legislation, voting officials switched to “discriminatory 
devices not covered by the federal decrees”). 
 4.  Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 314. For example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered 
Forrest County, Mississippi to give black voting applicants the same assistance its registrars had 
given to white applicants, and to register black applicants who had errors on their applications 
that were not serious enough to disqualify white applicants. The Mississippi Legislature 
responded by “requiring applicants to complete their registration forms without assistance or 
error.” United States v. Mississippi, 229 F. Supp. 925, 996–97 (S.D. Miss. 1964).  
 5.  Id. at 308.  
 6.  Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.  
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The Fifteenth Amendment states that the right to vote cannot be 
denied on the basis of “race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.”7 The Voting Rights Act was created to uphold the 
Fifteenth Amendment, by strengthening existing remedies to combat 
voter discrimination and by creating “stringent new remedies for 
voting discrimination.”8 Section 2 of the Act is a nationwide provision 
that prohibits voter discrimination9 and allows individuals to bring 
suit against any jurisdiction, including any State, “to challenge voting 
practices that have a discriminatory purpose or result.”10 Section 5 of 
the Act permits the Attorney General to review and approve any 
voting legislation proposed by specific jurisdictions; certain 
jurisdictions are identified by Section 4(b)’s coverage formula as 
being particularly likely to discriminate.11 
In Shelby County v. Holder,12 the Supreme Court will be called on 
to decide whether Congress’s 2006 reauthorization of Section 5 and 
Section 4(b)’s coverage formula in the Voting Rights Act is a 
permissible use of Congress’s Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment 
powers. Additionally, the Court may decide the appropriate standard 
of review under which to consider the constitutionality of legislation 
passed under Congress’s Section 2 power of the Fifteenth 
Amendment. Shelby County contends that Section 5 of the Act 
oversteps the boundaries of federalism and is no longer needed.13 In 
light of the long-standing history and importance of the Act, the 
Court’s precedents, and the continued existence of voting 
discrimination in this country, the Court is unlikely to find Section 5 
of the Act unconstitutional.14 The Court may, however, find Section 
4(b)’s coverage formula unconstitutional on the grounds that the 
formula’s data is outdated and it does not properly represent today’s 
political conditions. 
 
 7.  U.S. CONST. amend XV, § 1. 
 8.  Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308. 
 9.  42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 (West 2013). 
 10.  Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 854 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 
(U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-96). 
 11.  42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c. 
 12.  Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, No. 12-96 (U.S. argued Feb. 23, 2013). 
 13.  Brief for Petitioner at 18, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, No. 12-96 (U.S. Dec. 26, 2012) 
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. 
 14.  See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323 (1966) (“Congress may use any 
rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.”). 
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II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as a far-reaching 
statute to combat voter discrimination both at a national level and at 
a jurisdiction-specific level. Congress passed the Act under Section 2 
of the Fifteenth Amendment, which gives Congress the authority to 
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment through “appropriate legislation.”15 
In addition, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress 
has authority to pass “appropriate legislation”16 to uphold the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.17 
The Voting Rights Act contains permanent provisions and 
temporary provisions. The central permanent provision of the Act, 
Section 2, forbids any “standard, practice, or procedure” that “results 
in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United 
States to vote on account of race or color.”18 The temporary 
provisions, which include the “preclearance requirement of Section 5” 
and the coverage formula in Section 4(b), may be renewed 
periodically by Congress.19 The two provisions of the Act being 
challenged by Shelby County are Section 4(b) and Section 5. 
Congress uses the coverage formula of Section 4(b) to determine 
which jurisdictions are abridging the voting rights of their citizens 
within the meaning of the Act and are thus subject to Section 5’s 
preclearance requirements.20 The coverage formula covers 
jurisdictions that (1) used any voting test or device during 1964, 1968, 
or 1972, and (2) had less than 50% of its citizens either registered to 
vote or vote in the 1964, 1968, or 1972 presidential elections.21 The Act 
 
 15.  See U.S. CONST. amend XV, § 2 (“Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation.”). 
 16. Id. at amend XIV, § 5 (giving Congress authority to enact appropriate legislation to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 17.  See id., § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”). 
 18.  42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 (West 2013). The abridgement of voting rights includes the use of 
intimidation and providing false information in registering or voting. Id. § 1973i(b)–(c). 
 19.  See U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division Voting Section–Frequently Asked 
Questions, THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/misc/faq.php (last visited May 7, 2013) (“In 2006, Congress 
passed the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights and 
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 which renews nearly all of the temporary 
provisions of the Voting Rights Act.”). 
 20.  42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b(b). States can be covered jurisdictions within the meaning of the 
Act. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 
(U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-96) (describing the State of Alabama as a jurisdiction originally 
covered in its entirety). 
 21.  Id.  
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defines a voting test or device to be: 
any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or 
registration for voting (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, 
understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any 
educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular 
subject, (3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his 
qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or members of 
any other class.22 
A jurisdiction identified by Section 4(b) must, under Section 5, 
submit for approval all proposed voting changes to either the 
Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia.23 The Attorney General and the D.C. District Court will 
grant preclearance if the proposed voting change “neither has the 
purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to 
vote on account of race or color.”24 A voting change is considered to 
abridge the right to vote if it will have the effect of diminishing a 
citizen’s ability to elect his or her candidate of choice on account of 
race, color or speaking language.25 If the Attorney General or the D.C. 
District Court does not pre-clear the proposed change then the 
jurisdiction is prohibited from enacting the law or procedure.26 
A jurisdiction not identified by Section 4(b) can subsequently be 
brought under Section 5’s requirements by being “bailed-in”; a court 
may “bail-in” a jurisdiction if it is found to be denying the voting 
guarantees of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.27 As a 
countermeasure, the Act also allows jurisdictions to apply to be 
“bailed-out” of Section 5’s preclearance requirements and regain 
complete autonomy in passing voting legislation.28 
 
 22.  Id. § 1973b(c). 
 23.  Id. § 1973c. 
 24.  Id. § 1973c(a). 
 25.  Id. § 1973c(b). 
 26.  Id. § 1973c(a). 
 27.  Id. § 1973a(c). 
 28.  Id. § 1973b(a)(1). To qualify for bailout, the covered jurisdiction must show that the 
jurisdiction, as well as any of its sub-jurisdictions, has not in the preceding ten years: (1) used a 
test or device to determine voter eligibility; (2) received a judgment by any court holding that 
the jurisdiction has denied or abridged the right to vote on account of race or color; (3) had 
federal observers assigned to the jurisdiction; (4) been found to have passed a voting change 
without preclearance approval; or (5) had the Attorney General object to a proposed voting 
change under Section 5. Additionally, the jurisdiction has to ensure that it has eliminated voting 
procedures that “inhibit or dilute equal access to the electoral process,” and that it has “engaged 
in constructive efforts to eliminate intimidation and harassment” of voters. The jurisdiction 
must also have “engaged in other constructive efforts, such as expanded opportunity for 
convenient registration and voting for every person of voting age and the appointment of 
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Petitioner Shelby County, Alabama (Shelby County or the 
County) is a political subdivision of Alabama that has been subject to 
preclearance requirements since 1965.29 The County became a 
covered subdivision when Respondent United States Attorney 
General determined that Alabama should be a covered state pursuant 
to Section 4(b) because it had used a prohibited test or device and 
had a voter turnout of less than 50% for the 1964 presidential 
election.30 Since 1965, Shelby County and the jurisdictions within 
Shelby County have submitted at least 682 voting changes to the 
Attorney General for preclearance; the Attorney General objected to 
five of the proposed changes, including a proposed redistricting plan 
by a city located in Shelby County, which was submitted in 2008.31 The 
County has never applied for bailout, though it is likely ineligible as it 
has violated the Act by holding several special elections without 
seeking preclearance, and the Attorney General has objected to at 
least one proposed voting change within the last ten years.32 
Shelby County sought a declaratory judgment that Sections 4(b) 
and 5 of the Voting Rights Act are facially unconstitutional, and 
sought a permanent injunction barring the Attorney General from 
enforcing these sections.33 The District Court assessed Shelby 
County’s claims by examining two categories of evidence: first, by 
examining the types of evidence the Supreme Court has looked to in 
previous cases involving the Act,34 and second, by examining the types 
of evidence Congress cited to when it reauthorized the Act in 2006.35 
 
minority persons as election officials throughout the jurisdiction and at all stages of the election 
and registration process.” Id. § 1973b(a)(1)(A)–(F).  
 29.  Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 811 F.Supp.2d 424, 442 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 679 F.3d 848 
(D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2013) (No. 12–96) (citing 
Determination of the Attorney Gen. Pursuant to Voting Rights Act of 1965, 30 Fed. Reg. 9897 
(Aug. 7, 1965)).  
 30.  Determination of the Attorney Gen. Pursuant to Voting Rights Act of 1965, 30 Fed. 
Reg. 9897 (Aug. 7, 1965). 
 31.  Shelby Cnty., 822 F.Supp.2d at 442. 
 32.  Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 857 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S.Ct. 594 
(U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-96). See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 33.  Shelby Cnty., 811 F.Supp.2d at 427. 
 34.  Id. at 465 (assessing “evidence of (1) racial disparities in voter registration (and 
turnout); (2) the number of minority elected officials; and (3) the nature and number of Section 
5 objections”). A Section 5 objection refers to the Attorney General or a District Court 
rejecting a proposed voting change from a jurisdiction covered by Section 4(b)’s coverage 
formula. 
 35.  Id. at 465–66 (examining “evidence of [(1)] more information requests; [(2)] Section 
5 preclearance suits; [(3)] Section 5 enforcement actions; [(4)] Section 2 litigation; [(5)] the 
dispatch of federal observers; [(6)] racially polarized voting; and [(7)] Section 5's deterrent 
effect”). 
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Looking to the legislative record, the District Court found that there 
was still a significant disparity between white voter registration and 
minority voter registration,36 that the “percentage of minority elected 
officials . . . lag[ged] behind the minority percentage of the 
population” in 2006,37 and that there was still evidence of vote dilution 
and racially polarized voting.38 The court found that the existence of 
Section 5 objections39 in the legislative record demonstrated the 
power of preclearance in deterring jurisdictions from trying to pass 
discriminatory voter legislation.40 Further, the prevalence of Section 5 
objections suggested that Congress had “good reason to conclude in 
2006 that Section 5 was still fulfilling its intended function” of denying 
the passage of discriminatory voting laws.41 
The District Court denied the County’s motion for summary 
judgment and granted the Attorney General’s motion for summary 
judgment.42 Shelby County appealed the grant of summary judgment 
to the D.C. Circuit Court.43 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Since passing the Voting Rights Act in 1965, Section 5 has been 
reauthorized four times, most recently in 2006.44 Numerous challenges 
have been made to the reauthorizations and the Act itself, though the 
Court has consistently held that the Act, as passed, is constitutional.45 
 
 36.  Id. at 468. 
 37.  Id. at 469. 
 38.  Id. at 490. Additionally, the District Court found that “between 1982 and 2003, at least 
205 proposed voting changes were withdrawn by covered jurisdictions” after the Attorney 
General requested more information on the proposal. Id. at 476. Congress had found that these 
withdrawals were a strong indication of efforts to discriminate against voters. Id. at 477. 
Furthermore, the court used evidence of the Attorney General sending tens of thousands of 
federal observers to covered jurisdictions over the last twenty-five years to ensure fair elections 
as an indication of the continued need for federal oversight of local elections. Id. at 485.  
 39.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c (West 2013).  
 40.  Shelby Cnty., 811 F.Supp.2d at 492. The District Court highlighted that in lawsuits 
brought under Section 2, jurisdictions were still being found to have been intentionally 
discriminating against minority voters. Id. at 481.  
 41.  Id. at 476. Furthermore, the legislative record revealed forty-two unsuccessful 
declaratory judgment actions where a jurisdiction sought preclearance. Id. at 477. 
 42.  Id. at 508. 
 43.  Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 858 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S.Ct. 594 
(U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-96). 
 44.  Id. at 855. Congress reauthorized the temporary provisions of the Act, including 
Section 4(b) and Section 5, in 1970 for five years, in 1975 for seven years, in 1982 for twenty-five 
years, and finally in 2006 for another twenty-five years. Id. 
 45.  See Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 287 (1999) (adjudicating a challenge to the 
1982 reauthorization); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980) (adjudicating a 
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The Court’s holdings have relied on both the need to give judicial 
deference to Congress’s legislative decisions and the evidence of voter 
discrimination Congress presented prior to each reauthorization vote. 
More recently, however, the Court has signaled, in dicta, that it would 
defer less and that it may use a higher standard of review to analyze 
Congress’s decisions in the area of voting discrimination.46 
A. The Court’s Initial Willingness to Defer to Congress 
Within the realm of racial discrimination and voting, the Court has 
viewed congressional legislation deferentially. The basis for this 
deference is rooted in Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, which 
authorizes Congress to pass any “appropriate legislation” to enforce a 
citizen’s right to vote.47 After the Act was passed in 1965, its 
constitutionality was challenged almost immediately in 1966, in South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach.48 There, the Court held the Act’s provisions to 
be “valid means for carrying out the commands of the Fifteenth 
Amendment.”49 Even though the Court claimed that Section 5 
preclearance was an “uncommon exercise of congressional power,”50 
the Court found Section 5 to be within Congress’s mandate “to 
effectuate the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination 
in voting” under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.51 
Similarly, the Court approved Section 4(b)’s coverage formula 
even though Congress had reverse-engineered the formula—it had 
identified specific jurisdictions and then created a formula to capture 
those areas.52 The Court openly acknowledged that the formula did 
not cover every locality that had voting discrimination, yet it held that 
“[l]egislation need not deal with all phases of a problem in the same 
way, so long as the distinctions drawn have some basis in practical 
 
challenge to the 1975 reauthorization); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 541 (1973) 
(adjudicating a challenge to the 1970 reauthorization); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 
301, 337 (1966) (adjudicating a challenge to the 1965 passage of the Voting Rights Act).  
 46.  See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAUMDNO), 557 U.S. 193, 203 
(2009) (“For example, the racial gap in voter registration and turnout is lower in the States 
originally covered by [Section] 5 than it is nationwide.”). 
 47.  U.S. CONST. amend XV, § 2. 
 48.  383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
 49.  Id. at 337. 
 50.  See id. at 334 (“[T]he Court has recognized that exceptional conditions can justify 
legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.”). 
 51.  See id. at 326. 
 52.  See id. at 329 (noting that “Congress began work with reliable evidence of actual 
voting discrimination” in particular jurisdictions and that the “formula eventually evolved to 
describe these areas”). 
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experience.”53 Thus, the Court found the reverse-engineered formula 
constitutional and within Congress’s power to enforce the Fifteenth 
Amendment. 
In subsequent cases, the Court has exhibited a similar willingness 
to defer to Congress’s legislative decisions in this realm. For example, 
in City of Rome v. United States,54 the Court held that Congress’s 1975 
reauthorization of the Act was constitutional; it rejected a federalism 
argument against the Act on the ground that the principles of 
federalism “are necessarily overridden by the power to enforce the 
Civil War Amendments by appropriate legislation.”55 The Court 
emphasized that the Civil War Amendments were designed to expand 
federal power and limit state sovereignty.56 Moreover, the Court 
reiterated that “legislation enacted under authority of [Section] 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment would be upheld so long as the Court 
could find that the enactment is plainly adapted to [the] end of 
enforcing the Equal Protection Clause.”57 
B. Applying the Rational Basis Test to Voting Rights Act Legislation 
The Court has assessed the constitutionality of legislation passed 
by Congress under the Fifteenth Amendment using the rational basis 
test. Pursuant to this test, the Court has held that “[a]s against the 
reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means 
to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in 
voting.”58 Under the rational basis test, Congress is afforded 
considerable deference.  
To determine whether Congress’s legislation combating voter 
discrimination is rational, the Court has looked to the evidence 
collected by Congress during the debates on passing and 
reauthorizing the Act. In Katzenbach, the Court relied on the 
“voluminous legislative history of the Act contained in the committee 
hearings and floor debates”59 to conclude that Congress used 
 
 53.  Id. at 331. 
 54.  446 U.S. 156 (1980). 
 55.  Id. at 179 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 56.  Id. at 179. 
 57.  Id. at 176 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 58.  Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324. See also City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 177 (“Congress could 
rationally have concluded that, because electoral changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable 
history of intentional racial discrimination in voting create the risk of purposeful discrimination 
it was proper to prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact.”). 
 59.  See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309 (“We pause here to summarize the majority reports of 
the House and Senate Committees, which document in considerable detail the factual basis for 
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appropriate means to combat racial discrimination in voting.60 
Similarly, in City of Rome, the Court held that Congress’s 
reauthorization of the Act was rational because Congress had found 
that political progress by minorities had thus far been “modest and 
spotty.”61 The Court further noted that Congress had given “careful 
consideration to the propriety of readopting [Section] 5’s 
preclearance requirement.”62 
C. First-Generation Barriers to Voting Versus Second-Generation 
Barriers 
The Voting Rights Act was created to root out various types of 
devices and tactics used to deny minorities the right to vote.63 Some of 
the barriers identified by the Court, and reflected in the Act, include 
poll taxes and literacy tests.64 These types of barriers are commonly 
referred to as “first-generation barriers” to voting.65 Section 4(b)’s 
coverage formula was designed to identify jurisdictions that had 
implemented “first-generation barriers” to deny access to the voting 
polls.66 
Recently, Congress has emphasized eradicating “second-
generation barriers,” such as racially polarized voting67 and vote 
dilution. Vote dilution occurs when a majority group votes as a bloc to 
effectively nullify a minority group’s vote. The Court has never held 
that the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits vote dilution,68 however it 
has held that vote dilution can violate the Fourteenth Amendment.69 
 
these reactions by Congress.”). 
 60.  Id. at 308 (“Congress explored with great care the problem of racial discrimination in 
voting.”). 
 61.  City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 181 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308. 
 64.  Id. at 315–16. 
 65.  Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 
(U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-96). 
 66.  42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b(b) (West 2013). 
 67.  Racially polarized voting in this context refers to a pattern of voting where voters of 
one race support the same candidate while voters of another race all support a different 
candidate. 
 68.  Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board (Bossier II), 528 U.S. 320, 334 n.3 (2000).  
 69.  See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (“[Multimember legislative 
districts] could violate the Fourteenth Amendment if their purpose were invidiously to minimize 
or cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic minorities.”). 
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D. Gradual Erosion of the Level of Deference 
As Congress shifted its focus from first-generation barriers to 
voting to second-generation barriers, the Supreme Court distanced 
itself from Katzenbach and City of Rome and became less willing to 
defer to Congress’s legislative decisions. When Congress began 
addressing second-generation barriers to voting, it interpreted Section 
5 very broadly as it related to vote dilution. Section 5 provides that a 
voting change can only be precleared if the change “neither has the 
purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to 
vote on account of race or color.”70 Congress interpreted this to mean 
that the Act barred voting changes that were non-retrogressive but 
had a discriminatory purpose, as well as voting changes that had 
discriminatory, retrogressive effects regardless of purpose.71 
The Court disrupted Congress’s understanding of this provision in 
Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board (Bossier II)72 when it held that 
Section 5 “does not prohibit preclearance of a redistricting plan 
enacted with a discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose.”73 Thus, 
the Court nullified the part of the Act relating to voting changes that 
only had a discriminatory purpose.74 Because the Court has never held 
that the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits vote dilution,75 after Bossier 
II the most Section 5 could do in vote dilution cases was ensure that 
no backsliding occurred with new redistricting plans.76 In response to 
this decision, with the 2006 reauthorization of the Act, Congress 
imposed a “purpose” standard77 in Section 5 and included a provision 
that defined “purpose” to mean “any discriminatory purpose.”78 
 
 
 
 70.  42 U.S.C.A § 1973c(a). 
 71.  Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 811 F.Supp.2d 424, 436 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 679 F.3d 848 
(D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12–96).  
 72.  528 U.S. 320 (2000).  
 73.  Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 341.  
 74.  See Voting Rights Act: Section 5-Preclearance Standards, Hearing before the Subcomm. 
on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 12 (2005) (prepared 
statement of Mark A. Posner, Adjunct Professor, American University, Washington College of 
Law) (“Section 5 ‘purpose’ now has been given a highly specialized and esoteric meaning, the 
intent to cause retrogression. As a result, . . . the purpose standard now can almost never make a 
difference in whether or not a change is precleared.”). 
 75.  Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 334 n.3. 
 76.  Id. at 335. 
 77.  By imposing a purpose standard, Congress effectively reversed the Court’s holding in 
Bossier II. 
 78.  42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c(c) (West 2013). 
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In addition, Congress used the 2006 reauthorization to bypass the 
Court’s holding regarding a different aspect of Section 5. When 
Congress extended the Voting Rights Act in 1975, it specified that a 
voting change could not satisfy preclearance if the change augmented 
or diminished the ability of minority groups to elect candidates of 
their choice.79 The Supreme Court altered this interpretation in 
Georgia v. Ashcroft80 by holding that “the comparative ability of a 
minority group to elect a candidate of its choice . . . cannot be 
dispositive or exclusive” in a Section 5 retrogression inquiry.81 
Following this decision, Congress amended Section 5 of the Act to 
include a new provision stating that any voting change that has the 
purpose or effect of diminishing the ability of minority citizens to 
elect their preferred candidates is a change that denies minority 
citizens the right to vote.82 
E. The Court Indicates a Potential Change in Course 
When Congress reauthorized the Act in 2006, it maintained the 
long-standing purpose of the Act by not altering the coverage formula 
or the preclearance requirements. By 2006, the coverage formula was 
using data that was nearly forty years old and was still identifying 
jurisdictions that had used first-generation barriers to voting. Yet in 
2009, the Court gave its strongest indication that the deference 
Congress had enjoyed in earlier Voting Rights Act cases may no 
longer be appropriate.83 
Other than Shelby County, Northwest Austin Municipal Utility 
District No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO)84 is the only case the Court 
has heard on the constitutionality of the 2006 reauthorization of the 
Act. The petitioner in NAMUDNO was a utility district created in 
1987 to deliver city services to Travis County, Texas.85 A board of five 
 
 79.  Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).  
 80.  539 U.S. 461 (2003). 
 81.  Id. at 480. Thus, under the Court’s holding in Ashcroft, a State could redraw district 
lines so that minorities were likely able to elect candidates of their choice even if that 
probability was reduced as compared to the previous districting plan. Id. This would only be 
permissible if the State created more districts in this manner than the existing number of “safe” 
districts where it was “highly likely that minority voters w[ould] be able to elect the candidate of 
their choice.” Id. 
 82.  42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c(b), (d). 
 83. See NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009) (noting that the Voting Rights Act may not 
account for “current political conditions”). 
 84.  557 U.S. 193 (2009). 
 85.  Id. at 200. 
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members governed the district; Travis County oversaw elections for 
the board and the registration of voters for the board.86 Because the 
district was a political subdivision of Texas,87 and Texas became a 
covered state in 1975,88 the district’s election standards were subject to 
the preclearance requirements of Section 5.89 The district filed suit 
seeking to be bailed out of the obligations of Section 5, and in the 
alternative, claiming that Section 5 was unconstitutional.90 The 
Supreme Court only decided the first issue and held that all political 
subdivisions can file for bailout, even if they do not fall under the 
narrower definition of political subdivision in Section 14(c)(2)91 of the 
Voting Rights Act.92 
In addition to expanding the spectrum of jurisdictions that may be 
eligible for bailout in the future, the Court may have also offered a 
glimpse into its current stance on the Voting Rights Act. With regard 
to the appropriate standard of review, the district argued for a 
“congruence and proportionality” standard,93 and the government 
argued for a rational basis standard.94 Although the Court did not 
decide the appropriate standard of review, it did state that the Act 
“imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs.”95 
Moreover, the Court noted that past success in eliminating many 
“first-generation” barriers alone was insufficient to justify retaining 
the requirements of Section 5.96 Next, the Court suggested that the 
issues Section 5 was created to address may no longer be unique to 
 
 86.  Id.  
 87.  Id. at 206. 
 88.  Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975–Partial List of Determinations, 40 Fed. Reg. 
43746 (Sept. 23, 1975). 
 89.  NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 206. 
 90.  Id. at 200–01. 
 91.  Compare BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (abridged 9th ed. 2010) (defining “political 
subdivision” as “[a] division of a state that exists primarily to discharge some function of local 
government”), with 42 U.S.C.A. 1973l(c)(2) (West 2013) (“The term ‘political subdivision’ shall 
mean any county or parish, except that where registration for voting is not conducted under the 
supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include any other subdivision of a State which 
conducts registration for voting.”). 
 92.  NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 211. 
 93.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (“There must be a congruence 
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to 
that end.”). It should be noted that City of Boerne was a Fourteenth Amendment case regarding 
the extent of Congress’s ability to use its Section 5 enforcement power.  
 94.  NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 204. 
 95.  Id. at 203. 
 96.  See id. at 202 (“Past success alone, however, is not adequate justification to retain the 
preclearance requirements.”). 
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the jurisdictions singled out by Section 4(b)’s coverage formula.97 
Finally, the Court acknowledged that there was “considerable 
evidence that [the coverage formula] fails to account for current 
political conditions.”98 
IV. D.C. CIRCUIT COURT’S HOLDING 
With NAMUDNO in its periphery, the D.C. Circuit Court 
analyzed whether Section 5’s burdens on state sovereignty were 
justified by “current needs,” and whether Section 4(b)’s “disparate 
geographic coverage [was] sufficiently related to the problem that it 
target[ed].”99 The court found that Congress “drew reasonable 
conclusions from the extensive evidence it gathered and acted 
pursuant to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments” to 
reauthorize Sections 5 and 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act in 2006.100 
The Circuit Court thus affirmed the District Court’s decision.101 
A. Section 5 Preclearance 
The D.C. Circuit Court acknowledged that the standard of review 
for legislation enacted by Congress under Section 2 of the Fifteen 
Amendment is an unresolved issue.102 Yet, relying on dicta in 
NAMUDNO, the circuit court applied the congruent and 
proportional test to determine the constitutionality of the 
reauthorization of Section 5.103 The court noted that for the 
reauthorization to be congruent and proportional, Congress must 
have “documented sufficiently widespread and persistent racial 
discrimination in voting in covered jurisdictions” such that case-by-
case litigation under Section 2 of the Act, by itself, would prove 
inadequate.104 
 
 
 
 
 97.  Id. at 203. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 859 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 
(U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-96) (quoting NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)). 
 100.  Id. at 884. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at 859. 
 103.  Id. (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)). 
 104.  Id. at 864. 
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Over Shelby County’s objection, the court took into account 
evidence of vote dilution that Congress itself had considered when 
reauthorizing the statute.105 The court noted that though the Supreme 
Court has never held that the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits 
intentional vote dilution,106 the Court has held that invidious vote 
dilution violates the Fourteenth Amendment.107 Thus, the circuit court 
believed it was entitled to consider “numerous examples of modern 
instances of racial discrimination in voting”108—second generation 
barriers. 
Similar to the District Court, the D.C. Circuit reviewed the 
legislative record and found several categories of evidence that 
supported reauthorizing Section 5 for another twenty-five years.109 The 
court found the Attorney General’s claim “that the existence of 
Section 5 deterred covered jurisdictions from even attempting to 
enact discriminatory voting changes”110 to be very persuasive. The 
legislative record of the reauthorization demonstrated that, in 
comparison to Section 5’s straightforward preclearance power, 
Section 2 claims often involved costly and time-consuming litigation, 
which dissuaded potential litigants from pursuing valid claims.111 The 
court emphasized that while a Section 2 action was pending, a 
proponent of the challenged law could win election and enjoy the 
advantage of incumbency before the law was overturned.112 Further, a 
plaintiff with few resources could not easily seek a preliminary 
injunction in such an instance because of the heavy burden of proof 
required for preliminary injunctive relief.113 
 
 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. (citing City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980)). City of Mobile, 446 U.S. at 
66 (“We have recognized, however, that [multimember legislative districts] could violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment if their purpose were invidiously to minimize or cancel out the voting 
potential of racial or ethnic minorities.”).  
 108.  Shelby Cnty., 679 F.3d at 865. 
 109.  Id. at 864–66. 
 110.  Id. at 871 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 24 (2006)). Additionally, the legislative 
record revealed that minorities had obtained over 650 favorable outcomes in Section 2 lawsuits 
within covered jurisdictions from 1982 to 2005. Id. at 868. Furthermore, the Attorney General, 
pursuant to Section 5 preclearance rules, had objected to hundreds of proposed voting changes 
by covered jurisdictions based on the determination that the voting changes “would have a 
discriminatory purpose or effect.” Id. at 866. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. at 873. 
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Thus, the D.C. Circuit agreed with Congress’s assessment that 
“case-by-case enforcement” of voting rights, by itself, would 
inadequately protect minority citizens from the constitutional 
violations documented in the legislative record.114 After 
acknowledging that Congress is given deference when making 
legislative judgments,115 the D.C. Circuit ruled that Congress had 
reasonably concluded that Section 5 remained a critical component of 
the Voting Rights Act.116 
B. Section 4(b)’s Coverage Formula 
Next, the D.C. Circuit considered whether the statute’s geographic 
coverage was sufficiently related to the targeted problem. The D.C. 
Circuit used a study by Ellen Katz117 from the legislative record to 
compare the occurrence of discriminatory voting laws in covered and 
non-covered jurisdictions.118 By adjusting the data in the Katz study to 
account for population differences between states, the court found 
that the rate of successful Section 2 cases in covered jurisdictions was 
nearly four times higher than in non-covered jurisdictions.119 The D.C. 
Circuit also looked at unpublished Section 2 cases, which were 
primarily court-approved settlements, in both covered and non-
covered jurisdictions over the objections of Shelby County.120 The 
court found that eleven of the top fourteen states with the highest 
combined number of successful Section 2 cases from 1982 to 2004 
were covered states.121 The court concluded that “if discrimination 
were evenly distributed throughout the nation, [there would be] fewer 
successful [S]ection 2 cases in covered jurisdictions than in non-
 
 114.  See id. at 872 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 57 (2006)) (emphasizing that the 
County has “offered no basis” for the court to call into question Congress’s judgment based on 
its supporting evidence). 
 115.  See id. at 861 (“Congress ‘is far better equipped than the judiciary to amass and 
evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon legislative questions.’” (quoting Turner Broad. 
Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 196 (1997))). 
 116.  Id. at 873 (“[W]e, like the district court, are satisfied that Congress’s judgment 
[regarding Section 5] deserves judicial deference.”). 
 117.  Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643 (2006) [hereinafter 
Katz Study]. 
 118.  Shelby Cnty., 679 F.3d at 874 (referring to the Katz study as the “Impact and 
Effectiveness” study.).  
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 875–77. 
 121.  Id. at 876. These eleven states included the seven states that were originally covered by 
the Act in 1965: Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and 
Virginia. Id. 
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covered jurisdictions,” yet there were “substantially more.”122 
In determining the constitutionality of Section 4(b), the D.C. 
Circuit also considered the statute’s bailout and bail-in features.123 The 
court noted that the bailout mechanism “‘reduce[d] the possibility of 
overbreadth,’” which “‘ensure[d] Congress’[s] means [were] 
proportionate to [its] ends.’”124 Although Section 4(b)’s coverage 
formula uses old voting data, when supplemented with the legislative 
record and the bail-in and bailout provisions of the statute, the court 
concluded that the statute’s geographic coverage area sufficiently 
related to the problem of voter discrimination.125 
Shelby County appealed the Circuit Court’s decision to the 
Supreme Court under the Fifteenth Amendment.126 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to determine whether Congress exceeded “its 
authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments” by 
reauthorizing Section 5 of the Act under the “pre-existing coverage 
formula of Section 4(b).”127 
V. ARGUMENTS 
A.  Petitioner’s Argument 
Shelby County’s main contention is that Congress’s 2006 
reauthorization of Section 5’s preclearance requirement and Section 
4(b)’s coverage formula was unconstitutional given present voting 
conditions in the United States.128 First, Shelby County alleges that 
Section 5 “imposes current burdens” that are not “justified by current 
needs.”129 Second, Shelby County claims that even if Section 5 is 
constitutional,130 Section 4(b)’s “disparate geographic coverage”131 
does not adequately relate to the problem the Voting Rights Act is 
trying to fix.132 
 
 122.  Id. at 878 (emphasis in original). 
 123.  Id. at 881. 
 124.  Id. (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533, (1997)). 
 125.  Id. at 883. 
 126.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 2012 WL 3017723 (U.S. 
Jul. 20, 2012) (No. 12-96).  
 127.  Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, No. 12-96 (U.S. argued Feb. 23, 2013). 
 128.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 18–23. 
 129.  Id. at 23 (quoting NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)). 
 130.  Id. at 40. 
 131.  Id. (quoting NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 203). 
 132.  Id. at 21. 
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1. Shelby County’s Section 5 Argument 
Shelby County alleges that the type of voting discrimination that 
once made Section 5 preclearance appropriate legislation no longer 
exists today. Shelby County references a political climate in 1965 in 
which there was an “invidious practice of subtly and continuously 
altering discriminatory voting laws to circumvent” any gains 
minorities won through litigation.133 Today, preclearance is 
unnecessary; between 1982 and 2004 only about 0.74% of all 
preclearance submissions were objected to by the federal 
government.134 Congress itself said that “significant progress has been 
made in eliminating first[-]generation barriers . . . including increased 
numbers of registered minority voters, minority voter turnout, and 
minority representation” in political offices.135 
Shelby County notes that the focus now is on second-generation 
barriers to voting, such as racially polarized voting136 and vote 
dilution.137 However, the County does not consider polarized voting to 
be “governmental discrimination,” which it contends is the “only type 
of conduct Congress may remedy.”138 Moreover, Section 5 was passed 
in 1965 to combat “vote-denial schemes interfering with ballot 
access,” not claims of the diminishing “effect of ballots once cast.”139 
These claims of vote dilution should be handled through Section 2 
litigation and therefore “cannot justify preclearance.”140 
Furthermore, Shelby County argues Section 5 preclearance is 
unduly burdensome for covered jurisdictions.141 Preclearance greatly 
supersedes a State’s sovereign authority because a covered state is 
unable to create its own voting laws without first getting approval 
from the federal government.142 Additionally, the County proffers that 
“preclearance compliance has over the past decade required the 
commitment of state and local resources easily valued at over a 
 
 133.  Id. at 27–28. 
 134.  Id. at 29.  
 135.  Id. (quoting Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights 
Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 2(b)(1), 120 Stat. 577 
(2006)). 
 136.  Id. at 31.  
 137.  Id. at 19–20. 
 138.  Id. at 31. 
 139.  Id. at 32. 
 140.  Id. at 32–33. 
 141.  Id. at 24. 
 142.  Id. 
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billion dollars.”143 
Shelby County contends that the 2006 reauthorization of Section 5 
made it even more difficult to attain preclearance by requiring 
covered jurisdictions to prove that their proposed voting changes did 
not have “any discriminatory purpose.”144 In addition, Congress has 
changed Section 5’s “mission from preventing ‘backsliding’ . . . to 
ensuring a certain number of minority-preferred elected officials.”145 
Without evidence that the same type of “racial animus” that existed in 
1965 still exists today, Section 5 should not have been reauthorized.146 
2. Shelby County’s Section 4(b) Argument 
If Section 5 is found to be constitutional, then Shelby County 
contends that Section 4(b)’s coverage formula is unconstitutional. The 
formula in Section 4(b) was originally considered reliable because it 
was tied to the use of voting tests and devices, as well as low voter 
registration, which were prevalent in 1965.147 The formula’s reliance on 
data points from 1964, 1968, and 1972 cannot rationally identify the 
“jurisdictions likely to discriminate between 2007 and 2031.”148 For 
this reason alone, the formula should be found unconstitutional.149 In 
addition, Shelby County claims that the formula would not be rational 
even if it were updated to use voting data from the 1996, 2000, and 
2004 presidential elections—relying on those data points, Hawaii 
would be the only state identified as having current first-generation 
barriers to voting, which demonstrates that the triggers the formula 
uses are no longer relevant today.150 
 
 
 
 143.  Id. at 25 (quoting Modern Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, Hearing before the 
Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. S., 109th Cong. 110 (2006) (statement of Gregory S. Coleman, Weil 
Gotshall and Manges)). 
 144.  Id. at 26 (quoting Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting 
Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 
(2006)). 
 145.  Id. (quoting Bossier II, 528 U.S. 320, 335 (2000)). 
 146.  Id. at 39. 
 147.  See id, at 40 (“In Katzenbach, the Court found Section 4(b)’s formula sound in theory 
because its inputs . . . reliably indicated a ‘widespread and persistent’ use of intentionally 
discriminatory tactics to keep minorities from voting.” (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 
383 U.S. 301, 331 (1966))). 
 148.  Id. at 41. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. at 43–44. 
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Moreover, if the coverage formula is being used to target second-
generation barriers then it is under inclusive.151 The Katz Study 
highlights that the highest number of Section 2 lawsuits filed since 
1982 are found in both covered and non-covered jurisdictions.152 The 
County alleges that the bailout provision in the Act cannot save the 
coverage formula from its disparate coverage153 and that the bail-in 
provision “further undermines the formula’s constitutionality.”154 
Therefore, Section 4(b)’s coverage formula should be considered 
unconstitutional as it is no longer rational.155 
B.  Respondent’s Argument 
The United States Attorney General argues that while progress 
has been made since the passage of the Voting Rights Act, voting 
discrimination is still a serious problem in covered jurisdictions.156 
Consequently, the work of Section 5 is not complete and it should not 
be deemed unconstitutional.157 
1. The Government’s Section 5 Argument 
The Attorney General argues that Congress demonstrated the 
efficacy of and continued need for Section 5’s preclearance 
requirement. The legislative record shows that Section 5, which allows 
States to work with the Attorney General to create permissible laws, 
deters States from attempting to pass new discriminatory voting 
laws.158 Furthermore, the Attorney General contends that 
preclearance has helped to increase black voter registration.159 This 
success suggests Section 5 will help remedy the disparities between 
 
 151.  See id. at 46 (“A state-by-state comparison of Section 2 litigation data and racially 
polarized voting statistics confirms the irrationality of using Section 4(b)'s formula to address 
‘second generation’ barriers.”). 
 152.  See id. at 47 (“[N]on-covered Illinois had more Section 2 lawsuits filed since 1982 than 
all but three fully-covered States. The same is true of New York, and Florida, even disregarding 
the suits filed against their scattered covered jurisdictions.” (citation omitted)).  
 153.  Id. at 54. 
 154.  Id. at 57. 
 155.  See id at 40 (“An appropriate coverage formula must be ‘rational in both practice and 
theory.’ . . . [T]he archaic coverage formula reauthorized in 2006 is neither.” (quoting South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 330 (1966))). 
 156.  Brief for the Federal Respondent at 25, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, No. 12-96 (U.S. Jan. 
25, 2013) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. 
 157.  Id. at 12. 
 158.  See id. at 29 (noting that in 2012 the Attorney General worked with South Carolina to 
create a new photo-identification law that a court could preclear even though the Attorney 
General had objected to the initial law presented by South Carolina). 
 159.  Id. at 32–33. 
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Hispanic and non-Hispanic voter registration.160 
The Attorney General also argues that preclearance is still 
necessary to combat new and existing types of voting discrimination. 
First, the Attorney General continues to send federal observers to 
covered jurisdictions to monitor polling sites because minority voters 
recently faced voting discrimination in these areas.161 Second, the 
legislative record identified “ongoing problems of vote suppression, 
voter intimidation, and vote dilution.”162 Although the Court has not 
decided whether the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits vote dilution, 
Congress has “unquestioned authority” to bar intentional vote 
dilution under the Fourteenth Amendment.163 Congress has 
repeatedly reauthorized Section 5 to prevent covered jurisdictions 
from attempting to minimize the effectiveness of votes cast by 
minority citizens, including by vote dilution.164 
Finally, the Attorney General rejects the County’s argument that 
voter discrimination can be effectively combated by Section 2 
lawsuits.165 First, in order to gather sufficient evidence to prove the 
discriminatory effect of an illegal voting practice, the voting law must 
remain in effect for several voting cycles.166 Thus, covered jurisdictions 
are able to enjoy the benefits of the discriminatory voting scheme 
until sufficient evidence has been accumulated.167 Second, Section 2 
lawsuits place the burden on minority plaintiffs to prove the 
discriminatory aspects of a voting law, whereas Section 5 preclearance 
places the burden on covered jurisdictions.168 Covered jurisdictions are 
much better equipped to gather information about possible voter 
discrimination.169 Third, the Attorney General argues that “Section 2 
 
 160.  Id. at 33. 
 161.  Id. at 31. The Act also allows the Attorney General to send federal observers to 
polling sites in jurisdictions covered by Section 4(b) when necessary to protect the voting rights 
of citizens under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973f (West 2013). 
Unlike the Attorney General, courts can send federal observers to any jurisdiction that has a 
Section 2 lawsuit pending even if the jurisdiction is not covered by Section 4(b)’s coverage 
formula. Id. § 1973a(a). 
 162.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 156, at 33. 
 163.  Id. at 36.  
 164.  Id. at 37.  
 165.  See id. at 39–40 (“Petitioner asserts that Section 2 affords a sufficient remedy. But that 
is a judgment for Congress to make, and after months of hearings, Congress concluded 
otherwise.” (citation omitted)). 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. at 40. 
 169.  Id. 
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places a heavy financial burden on minority voters who challenge 
illegal election practices” compared to the modest financial burden 
placed on the covered jurisdictions seeking preclearance.170 
2. The Government’s Section 4(b) Argument 
The Attorney General argues that Section 4(b)’s coverage formula 
continues to target the jurisdictions with the most frequent instances 
of voting discrimination.171 The Government dismisses the importance 
of the data used in the formula because Congress “‘reverse-
engineer[ed]’ the coverage criteria in Section 4(b) to describe in 
objective terms those jurisdictions Congress already knew it wanted 
to cover.”172 The important question in 2006 was not about the need to 
update the coverage criteria, but whether Section 5 was still needed in 
the covered jurisdictions, which Congress answered in the 
affirmative.173 The Attorney General notes that if Section 5 
preclearance was unnecessary then covered jurisdictions should have 
fewer successful Section 2 lawsuits than non-covered jurisdictions, yet 
this is not what Congress found.174 
Finally the Attorney General argues that the geographic coverage 
area of Section 5 is not solely reflected in Section 4(b)’s coverage 
formula.175 The bailout and bail-in provisions of the Voting Rights Act 
ensure that the coverage area is neither over-inclusive nor under-
inclusive.176 The Attorney General contends that it is “neither unduly 
difficult nor expensive for eligible jurisdictions to bail out of Section 5 
coverage.”177 The Voting Rights Act properly identifies the 
jurisdictions with the most concentrated racial discrimination in 
voting, which allows Section 5 to “‘sufficiently relate[] to the problem 
that it targets.’”178 
 
 
 170.  Id. at 40–41. 
 171.  Id. at 49–50. 
 172.  Id. at 49. 
 173.  Id. at 49–50. 
 174.  Id. at 53. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  See id. at 53–54 (“[T]he geographic scope of Section 5 is not reflected in the coverage 
criteria in Section 4(b) alone.”). 
 177.  Id. at 54. 
 178.  Id. at 57 (quoting NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)). 
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VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION 
The Supreme Court will have to determine whether the Voting 
Rights Act is constitutional given the political conditions of 2013, and 
it should do so under the rational basis test. The Court may avoid 
addressing the constitutionality of Section 5 by first determining that 
Section 4(b) is unconstitutional, but this is inadvisable.179 Instead, the 
Court should first determine that Section 5 is constitutional because 
voting discrimination is still prevalent in the United States. The Court 
should hold that Section 4(b), however, is unconstitutional because 
the coverage formula’s criteria and focus is outdated. 
A.  The Court Should Continue to Use the Rational Basis Test 
Since Katzenbach, the Supreme Court has repeatedly used the 
rational basis test to determine the constitutionality of the Act.180 The 
rational basis test is an appropriate standard of review because 
Congress has authority under the Fifteenth Amendment to pass 
“appropriate legislation” to combat voter discrimination.181 Although 
Shelby County argues for using the “congruence and proportionality” 
standard,182 this standard is inappropriate here because it has only 
been used in cases involving Congress’s Section 5 power under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.183 
 
 179.  Another avenue the Court can take to decide Shelby County is through the Elections 
Clause, found in Article I of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. The clause permits 
“Congress to make or alter those districts [for federal elections] if it wished.” Vieth v. Jubelirer, 
541 U.S. 267, 275 (2004) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court can 
avoid deciding the case on Fourteenth Amendment and Fifteenth Amendment grounds if it 
decides that the Elections Clause grants “clear authority for Congress to enact Section 5 
[pre]clearance procedures for state laws concerning federal elections.” Brief of Gabriel Chin et 
al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 4, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, No. 12-96 (U.S. 
Feb. 1, 2013). However, given the reservations expressed by the Court during oral arguments for 
NAMUDNO, it is unlikely the Court will approve of a legal argument that could potentially 
allow preclearance to continue in perpetuity. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, 
NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193 (2009) (U.S. Apr. 29, 2009) (“[A]t some point it begins to look like 
the idea is that [the Act] is going to go on forever.”). 
 180.  See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966) (“Congress may use any 
rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.”); 
Brief for Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents 
at 7, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, No. 12-96 (U.S. Feb. 1, 2013) (“[I]n evaluating prior extensions of 
Section 5 . . . this Court has applied rational basis review.”). 
 181.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 (“Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation.”). 
 182.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (“There must be a congruence 
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to 
that end.”). 
 183.  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218 (2003) (“[P]etitioners ask us to apply the 
‘congruence and proportionality’ standard described in cases evaluating exercises of 
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Admittedly, in NAMUDNO, some of the language used in dicta 
suggests the Court might adopt a more demanding standard of 
review.184 Nonetheless, the Court has consistently held that Congress 
should be given deference when it legislates under the Fifteenth 
Amendment.185 Moreover, Congress has presented considerable 
evidence identifying continued voter discrimination each time the Act 
has been up for reauthorization. Thus, there is nothing that justifies a 
departure from applying the rational basis standard to reviewing 
legislation Congress passed to combat voter discrimination. 
B.  Section 4(b)’s Coverage Formula Most Likely Will Not Survive 
The most difficult decision before the Supreme Court is how 
much weight to give precedent. After Katzenbach held that Section 
4(b)’s reverse-engineered formula was constitutional—more than fifty 
years ago186—the Court has not reconsidered the constitutionality of 
the formula. Moreover, the last time the coverage formula was 
substantially amended was in 1975, when Congress added data from 
the 1972 presidential election to the formula’s calculus.187 However, 
because 2013 does not reflect 1972 and because this is the first solely 
facial challenge to the 2006 reauthorization of the Act,188 it is 
questionable how much value the Court will give this underlying 
precedent. 
 
 
Congress'[s] power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. But we have never applied that 
standard outside the § 5 context.” (citation omitted)). 
 184.  NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009) (“[The Act’s] departure from the fundamental 
principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage 
is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”). 
 185.  See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980) (“[The Civil War] 
Amendments were specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on 
state sovereignty.”); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) (“Congress has full 
remedial powers to effectuate the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in 
voting). 
 186.  South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 329 (1966). The original basis for the 
reverse-engineered formula was to somehow capture most of the jurisdictions that had a long 
history of bypassing federal laws and discriminating against voters. Christopher B. Seaman, An 
Uncertain Future for Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The Need for a Revised Bailout System, 
30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 9, 17 (2010). 
 187.  Act to Amend the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400, 401 
(1975). 
 188.  In NAMUDNO the petitioner conditionally challenged the constitutionality of 
Sections 4(b) and 5, which allowed the Supreme Court to avoid determining the 
constitutionality of the 2006 reauthorization of the Act by Congress. NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 
205. 
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With the 2006 reauthorization, Congress had the opportunity to 
amend the coverage formula to better represent current political 
conditions, but it actively chose not to do so.189 Thus, under the Act as 
passed, come 2031, jurisdictions that committed voting violations in 
the 1960s and 1970s and that have not achieved bailout will still need 
preclearance from the federal government to pass new voting 
legislation. Yet, according to Representative Norwood, if the 
formula’s underlying data had been changed to only include voter 
registration data and turnout rates from the 1996, 2000, and 2004 
presidential elections, Hawaii would be the only fully covered state.190 
The covered jurisdictions under the updated data formula are not 
ones that have had a long history of voter discrimination.191 During 
oral arguments for NAMUDNO, Chief Justice Roberts pointedly 
asked if the position of the appellant was that “southerners are more 
likely to discriminate than northerners” since the current coverage 
formula’s use of data from over forty years ago causes it to 
disproportionately cover southern jurisdictions.192 The difference 
between the jurisdictions that are identified by the “updated” formula 
compared to the current formula is too wide for the Court to 
reasonably conclude that the formula reflects current political 
conditions. 
Furthermore, the criteria used to determine covered and non-
covered jurisdictions is outdated. The coverage formula was created at 
a time when Congress was trying to fight against first-generation 
barriers to voting, such as poll taxes, literacy tests, and outward 
intimidation at voting sites.193 These barriers are different from the 
voter polarization and vote dilution problems that Congress is trying 
to combat today. Yet, Congress’s shift in focus has not led it to change 
the criteria used to identify jurisdictions.194 The current coverage 
 
 189.  See Seaman, supra note 186, at 38–39 (2010) (indicating that Representative Charlie 
Norwood introduced an amendment that “would ‘update’ the Section 5 coverage formula using 
voter registration and turnout rates from a ‘rolling test’ based off of the last three presidential 
elections.”(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 109-554, at 2 (2006))).  
 190.  Id. at 39. This type of an update would also cover 1010 jurisdictions in thirty-nine 
states. Id. 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193 (2009) (U.S. Apr. 29, 
2009). 
 193.  See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966) (“Congress felt itself 
confronted by an insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our 
country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution.”). 
 194.  For example, because Congress has been using factors that pertain to first-generation 
barriers, the formula does not cover counties in Ohio and Florida, which have some of the most 
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formula is unable to identify jurisdictions that are currently covered 
for first-generation offenses that have not had second-generation 
offenses. Therefore, the coverage formula is unconstitutionally 
superseding the sovereignty of States that do not have second-
generation offenses. 
Despite the bailout and bail-in corrective provisions of the Act, 
the Court is still unlikely to uphold the current formula. Since 1984, 
thirty-eight bailouts have been granted for 196 jurisdictions, with 
twenty of those bailouts occurring after the Court’s NAMUDNO 
decision expanded the availability of bailout to many more 
jurisdictions.195 The NAMUDNO Court seemed less than enthused by 
the number of bailouts from 1982 to 2008.196 Moreover, the 
requirements to maintain bailout status197 may still prove too onerous. 
Thus, the Court should strike the coverage formula because the data 
and criteria used are outdated, and because it is considerably difficult 
for a jurisdiction to achieve bailout. This will signal to Congress that a 
formula must rationally relate to current conditions to justify its use 
for an extended period of time. 
C. Section 5 Preclearance is Still Constitutional 
If the Court first finds Section 4(b) unconstitutional, then it may 
not rule on the constitutionality of Section 5 due to the severability 
doctrine.198 The first prong of the severability test requires that the 
statute, in this case Section 5, continue to operate fully as law without 
the invalidated portion of the statute.199 The second prong requires 
courts to leave the remaining parts of the statute intact unless the 
legislature would not have enacted these parts independently of the 
 
recent examples of voting rights violations. Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the 
New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 208 (2007). 
 195.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 156, at 54. 
 196.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193 (2009) (U.S. Apr. 
29, 2009) (having being told that eighteen bailouts had been granted since 1982, Justice Scalia 
responded that “[i]t’s obviously quite impracticable . . . for anybody to bail out.”). 
 197.  42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b(a)(1)(A)–(F) (West 2013). 
 198.  See Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 
3161 (2010) (“Generally speaking, when confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, we try to 
limit the solution to the problem,” severing any “problematic portions while leaving the 
remainder intact. Because [t]he unconstitutionality of a part of an Act does not necessarily 
defeat or affect the validity of its remaining provisions, the normal rule is that partial, rather 
than facial, invalidation is the required course.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
 199.  Kenneth A. Klukowski, Severability Doctrine: How Much of a Statute Should Federal 
Courts Invalidate?, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 54 (2011). 
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invalidated portion of the statute.200 Here, Section 5 preclearance is 
predicated on the existence of some formula identifying the 
jurisdictions that will be subject to Section 5’s provisions. Therefore, 
without Section 4(b)’s coverage formula, Section 5 cannot work and 
cannot pass the first prong of the severability doctrine. 
However, given the historical significance of this piece of 
legislation, as well as the focus on Section 5 in the certiori order, the 
Court may first determine the constitutionality of preclearance before 
focusing on the coverage formula.201 To rule on the permissibility of 
Section 5, the Court will have to answer three questions: (1) Are the 
current burdens imposed by preclearance justified by current needs; 
(2) in the absence of preclearance, can Section 2 litigation adequately 
handle future problems of racial voter discrimination; and (3) are the 
factors needed for preclearance constitutionally permissible. 
The first question was set up by the NAMUDNO Court.202 
Congress’s 2006 findings of racial voting discrimination must be 
weighed against the substantial federalism costs imposed by 
preclearance. In addition to the anecdotes of voter discrimination 
collected for the congressional hearings, the results from the Katz 
Study offer further evidence of continued voter discrimination. 
Although there are minor imperfections in the testing methods,203 the 
Katz Study did note a higher number of successful Section 2 lawsuits 
in covered jurisdictions than in non-covered jurisdictions.204 
Preclearance ought to act as a deterrent for voter discrimination, 
which would suggest that covered jurisdictions should have fewer 
Section 2 cases than non-covered jurisdictions.205 The difference 
 
 200.  Id. at 56. 
 201.  The question presented in the certiorari order was phrased in terms of the 
constitutionality of Section 5 of the Act, as opposed to Section 4(b). Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 
S. Ct. 594, 594 (2012) (phrasing the question presented as whether the 2006 reauthorization of 
Section 5 was constitutional under the preexisting coverage formula of Section 4(b)). It would 
be unusual for the Court to avoid deciding the constitutionality of Section 5 a second time, 
because it did so only four years ago in NAMUDNO. See, 557 U.S. at 205 (disposing of the case 
on other grounds). 
 202.  See NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 203 (“It may be that these improvements [because of the 
Act] are insufficient and that conditions continue to warrant preclearance under the Act. But 
the Act imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs.” (citations omitted)). 
 203.  The study was only able to identify 331 lawsuits that addressed Section 2 claims since 
1982, but believed that this “conservatively suggest[ed] that there ha[d] been more than 1,600 
Section 2 filings nationwide.” Katz Study, supra note 117, at 655. 
 204.  See id. at 655–56 (“Of the 123 successful plaintiff outcomes documented, 68 originated 
in covered jurisdictions, and 55 elsewhere.”). 
 205.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 156, at 29; Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 871 
(D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-96). 
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between expectation and reality indicates that there is a continued 
need for preclearance.206 
Next, the Court will have to determine if Section 2 case-by-case 
litigation can adequately replace the protection of preclearance. 
Several covered states have noted that “Section 2 litigation is so costly 
and burdensome,”207 compared to applying for preclearance.208 
Furthermore, in Section 2 lawsuits the impetus of bringing forth an 
action rests entirely on individual litigants who do not typically have 
the resources to shepherd an entire case, whereas in preclearance the 
onus is on States who are far better equipped. Individual litigants 
must themselves pursue temporary injunctions if they want the 
discriminatory voting practice suspended for the duration of the 
lawsuits. The difficulty in obtaining temporary injunctions coupled 
with the incumbency pitfalls of Section 2 litigation209 demonstrates 
that Section 2 lawsuits cannot, on their own, adequately ensure the 
rights of the Fifteenth Amendment. 
Potential difficulties for upholding preclearance may surface when 
the Court tries to answer question three. With the 2006 
reauthorization of the Act, Congress included provisions in Section 
5210 that overturned the Supreme Court’s holdings in Georgia211 and 
Bossier II.212 If the holdings in these two cases turned on statutory 
interpretation then Congress’s redefinition of the statute must be 
permissible. However, one of Congress’s 2006 amendments to Section 
5 requires the creation of districts where minorities have the ability to 
elect the candidates of their choice.213 This seemingly violates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it 
 
 206.  A potential issue that may come up with the first question is whether second-
generation barriers to voting represent a current need that Section 5 was designed to combat. 
The Court has not yet addressed the constitutionality of vote dilution under the Fifteenth 
Amendment. However, the Court is unlikely to make a determination in this case because 
Shelby County has not raised that issue. 
 207.  Brief for the States of New York et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 
9, Shelby Cnty v. Holder, No. 12-96 (U.S. Feb. 1, 2013).  
 208.  Id. at 4. 
 209.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 156, at 39–40. 
 210.  42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c(b)–(d) (West 2013). 
 211.  See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 482 (2003) (“A court must examine whether a 
new plan adds or subtracts ‘influence districts’ where minority voters may not be able to elect a 
candidate of choice but can play a substantial, if not decisive, role in the electoral process.”).  
 212.  See Bossier II, 528 U.S. 320, 328 (2000) (“[T]he language of § 5 leads to the conclusion 
that the ‘purpose’ prong of § 5 covers only retrogressive dilution.”). 
 213.  42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c(b). 
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requires race to become a predominant factor in redistricting.214 In 
order to preserve Section 5, the Court should simply invalidate the 
offensive provision—42 U.S.C. § 1973c(b). Ultimately, Section 5 
preclearance should be held rationally permissible given the record of 
voter discrimination amassed by Congress, as well as the burdens 
created by solely relying on Section 2 lawsuits. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In Shelby County, the Supreme Court is likely to find the Voting 
Rights Act’s Section 4(b) coverage formula unconstitutional. Given 
the magnitude of this ruling, the Court is likely to first find Section 5’s 
preclearance requirement to be constitutional, which should allow 
Congress to create new criteria that can better identify the 
jurisdictions that should currently be under the purview of Section 5. 
This will not be a popular decision and it will fly in the face of 
substantial precedent. However, the conditions in 1982 that justified 
reauthorization of the coverage formula were not the same conditions 
in 2006 nor today. Just as barriers to voting have evolved from “first-
generation” to “second-generation,” so too should Congress’s 
legislation to fight these barriers. 
 
 
 214.  See Georgia, 539 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy J., concurring) (“Race cannot be the 
predominant factor in redistricting . . . . Yet considerations of race that would doom a 
redistricting plan under the Fourteenth Amendment or § 2 seem to be what save it under § 5.”). 
